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ECONOMIC CRISIS IN NEW EU MEMBER STATES IN CENTRAL 






After giving a general view of the economic crisis in new EU member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe, this paper examines the causes, focusing on Baltic States, especially Latvia.   
Thanks to the Single Market of the EU, workers in this country became able to migrate to 
advanced EU countries, especially the UK, decreasing the unemployment rate and at the same time 
causing a sharp increase in wages due to a tightened labor market. Banks from Nordic countries, 
Sweden in particular, came to operate in Latvia and competed for market shares, stirring a 
consumption boom. In a situation in which people can easily get loans denominated in foreign 
currency, monetary policies of the central bank are of no use. The Latvian economy already showed a 
sign of overheating in 2005. However, in the spring of 2007, the government turned to restrictive 
policies, causing depression at the end of 2007. In addition, the Lehman shock dealt the Latvian 
economy its final blow.  
Baltic States have shared a common weakness in terms of their development relying heavily on 
foreign capitals. In the case of Estonia and Lithuania, however, the circumstances in which foreign-
owned banks have been overwhelmingly dominating the banking sector benefited these countries. As 
parent banks of foreign-owned banks coped with difficulties, both countries were able to avoid the 
worst case scenario.   
Latvia, which is reconstructing its economy under support from the EU and the IMF, set up 
the introduction of the euro in 2013 as an exit strategy. Latvia is in dilemma: If the country does 
not devalue its national currency and tries to satisfy the Maastricht criteria (especially having a 
budget deficit of less than 3% of the GDP) soon, it will be obliged to adopt pro-cyclical policies, 
causing economic stagnation.    
There is a scenario in which the financial crisis in Latvia might cause disorder in the EU 
economy via the possible collapse of Swedish bank(s), but the likelihood that this will come to pass 
seems very small. 
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1. Introduction 
 
More than twenty years have passed since the system change in Central and East 
European countries (Central Europe + South Eastern Europe + Baltic States). These 
countries have undergone remarkable development since the mid-1990s and have 
realized a long-cherished desire, i.e. membership of the European Union (EU) from 
2004 through 2007. The new EU member states (NMS) seemed to continue their 
economic development in a relatively satisfactory way even after dark clouds began 
to hang over the world economy in 2007 due to the subprime loan problem in the 
USA. However, the global financial crisis arising from the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 caused NMS to take a direct hit. The NMS have been 
more or less in economic crisis. The economic crisis has been very serious in 
Hungary and the Baltic states. Some newspapers reported that the crisis in NMS 
might shake advanced EU member states (for example, Austria, Sweden, etc.) due to 
a huge amount of credit which banks in the latter countries have given
1.  
    To begin with, this paper tries to grasp the general picture of the economic 
crisis in the NMS in Central and Eastern Europe, mainly based on studies by a 
research group at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). 
Then focusing on the Baltic States, Latvia in particular, which has supposedly been in 
a most serious situation, reasons for why the crisis has become so serious are 
explored. Next, questions which the economic crisis in the Baltic States raised are 
examined, that is, the effectiveness of the prescription from the EU and the IMF, as 
well as a scenario in which the financial crisis in Latvia might cause disorder in the 
EU economy via the possible collapse of Swedish bank(s). Finally the paper reaches 
some conclusions. 
   
2. Economic Crisis in NMS: Various Scenes   
Among NMS we can find various scenes of the economic crisis, ranging from 
countries with very serious crisis to countries with rather milder crisis. These 
countries can be classified into several groups. When we look at the extent of the fall 
i n  G D P  g r o w t h  r a t e s  i n  Q 1  o f  2 0 0 9  c o mpared with Q2 of 2008 (Table 1), six 
countries have experienced double-digit falls in GDP growth rates, starting with 
Lithuania at -18.8% to Bulgaria at -10.6%. It is in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that 
GDP growth rates continued to make double-digit falls in 2009. These three 






                                                 
1 For example, a news item that reported on “Latvia’s crisis” causing unrest in Europe. Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, June 10, 2009.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  33 
Table 1  Extent of the Growth Reversal   
   
Change in quarterly GDP growth 
rates, Q1 2009 compared to  
Q2 2008, percentage points 
GDP growth rates                
real change in % against            
preceding year 
      2008 2009  2009 
           Q2 Q1  Forecast 
Lithuania   -18.8     5.2  -13.6    -16 
Latvia -16.1    -1.9  -18.0    -20 
Romania -15.5    9.3  -6.2    -6 
Estonia -14.0    -1.1  -15.1    -16 
Slovenia -14.0    5.5  -8.5    -4 
Slovakia -13.5    7.9  -5.6    -5 
Bulgaria -10.6    7.1  -3.5    -3 
Hungary -8.8    2.1  -6.7    -6.5 
Czech Republic  -8.2    4.9  -3.3   -1.5 
Poland -5.1     5.9  0.8    0.8 
Source: Richter, et al (2009), p.3.                 
 
Table 2  Changes in the Unemployment Rate   
       Forecast 
   1991 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2010  2011 
Czech 
Republic  4.1  4.0 8.8 8.3    7.9  7.1 5.3  4.4  7  7  6.5 
Hungary  7.4  10.3 6.4 6.1    7.2 7.5 7.4  7.8  10.5  11  10 
Poland  11.8  13.3 16.1 19.0   17.8 13.8  9.6  7.1  9  10  9 
Slovakia  n.a. 13.1 18.6 18.1   16.2 13.4 11.1  9.5  13  14  14 
Slovenia  8.2  7.4 7.0 6.3   6.6 6.0 4.8  4.4  7 7.5  7 
Bulgaria 11.1  16.5  16.9 12.0    10.1 9.0 6.9  5.6  9  9  8 
Romania 3.0  n.a. 6.9  8.0   7.2 7.3 6.4  5.8  9  9  8 
Estonia   n.a. 9.7  13.6  9.6  7.9 5.9 4.7  5.5  15  18  18 
Latvia  n.a. 18.9 14.5 10.4   8.7 6.8 6.0  7.5  18  22  20 
Lithuania  0.3  17.5 16.4 11.4   8.3 5.6 4.3  5.8  15  19  18 
Source: Richter, et al. (2009), p.19; wiiw Handbook of Statistics 2007, p.19; For 1991, EBRD (1998), 
Transition Report 1998. 
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Although there are certain influences from the global financial crisis, depression 
is milder in the Czech Republic and Poland compared with the Baltic states. In other 
countries the magnitude of the impact is in the mid-level range in the Baltic states, 
and in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
A point which surprises many outside observers when looking at statistics on 
loans in Central and Eastern Europe is the fact that households and companies have 
had a very high share of loans in foreign currency of all total loans (Table 3). The 
share of loans denominated in foreign currency of all total loans has been very high 
in the Baltic States, especially in Latvia and Estonia, which ranged from the 80% 
mark to nearly 90%, and in Latvia it exceeded 90% in 2009. In Lithuania, Hungary 
and Romania it accounts for about two-thirds of total loans. In Bulgaria it has been 
fluctuating on the 50% mark. In Poland it increased from a quarter to one-third of 
total loans during the period April 2008 through April 2009. It is noteworthy that in 
three countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia it has been very low
2.  
 
Table 3  Share of Loans in Foreign Currency in% of Total Loans, End of period   
   2008   2009   
   Apr May Jun Jul  Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb  Mar  Apr 
Czech 
Republic  12.9 13.0 12.4 12.6 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.6 14.1 14.4 14.4 13.8 13.4 
Hungary    53.8 56.6 56.3 55.7 56.9 58.7 63.7 63.0 64.6 67.3 67.4 68.2 66.3 
Poland  24.3 24.1 24.6 24.2 25.8 27.0 30.1 30.0 33.1 34.8 35.8 35.5 33.9 
Slovakia 1)        17.7     17.3     17.6     3.9  
Slovenia  2)  6.8 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.7 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.4 6.1 6.0 
Bulgaria  52.7 53.3 54.2 54.7 55.8 55.7 56.3 56.6 57.1 57.4 57.7 57.6 57.7 
Romania  62.4 62.5 62.8 62.7 63.0 63.4 63.5 63.6 63.9 64.2 64.1 64.1 63.9 
Estonia  82.5 82.9 83.6 84.3 84.6 84.7 84.9 85.1 85.3 85.7 86.0 86.4 86.7 
Latvia  85.8 83.9 87.7 89.8 88.2 87.4 88.9 88.6 89.8 91.6 91.9 92.1 91.0 
Lithuania  61.2 61.7 62.3 62.3 62.7 62.8 62.8 63.4 64.0 64.9 65.7 66.2 66.9 
Note: 1) From 2008 non-euro currencies only; 2) Non-euro currencies only.   
Source: Richter, et al (2009), p.11. 
 
Among countries relying on foreign capital, the Czech Republic has not suffered 
such serious damage. In this country the share of loans denominated in foreign 
currency of total loans is low. The exposure of the Czech banks to sub-prime 
securities is negligible. Despite quite vigorous GDP growth, the domestic credit 
                                                 
2 In contrast to those countries, short-term foreign debt as a percentage of foreign reserves has been 
very high in the Baltic States. In Latvia this share was 277.8% in Q1 2007, and it increased to 302.7% 
in Q4 2007 and then decreased but was still as high as 250.7% in Q1 2009. Similarly in Estonia this 
share has been high, fluctuating around 250%. In Lithuania this share is lower, fluctuating between 
100% and 150% (Richter, et al, 2009, p. 23).   Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  35 
expansion has been rather sluggish when compared with other NMS. The 
deposit/loans ratio exceeds 1 by a large margin and the net external position of 
Czech banks is positive (unique among the NMS). Moreover, unlike the situation in 
other NMS, loans denominated in foreign currencies were not attractive since Czech 
interest rates have tended to be lower than the foreign ones (Richter, et al. 2009, 
p.13). 
 
Table 4  Exchange Rate Regime and Prospect for Introduction of the Euro 
Country  Exchange Rate Regime  Target Date for Introduction of Euro 
Estonia   Currency Board  Currently ERMII. 2011 
Latvia  Pegged to Euro  Currently ERMII. Changed from 2008 to 2013. 
Lithuania  Currency Board  Currently ERMII.  Not fixed. 
Slovenia  Euro (since January 1, 2007)     
Slovakia  Euro (since January 1, 2009)     
Poland Floating  Exchange  Rate  2013, but will be extended. 
Hungary  Floating Exchange Rate  After 2012 
Czech Republic  Floating Exchange Rate  Changed from 2010 to 2012. 
Bulgaria Currency  Board  Not  fixed. 
Romania Floating  Exchange  Rate  Plans to join ERM II in 2012, and Euro in 
2014. 
Source: Extrapolated by the author, based on information from CEE Quarterly and newspapers. 
 
        Among NMS in Central and Eastern Europe, only Poland managed to 
maintain positive GDP growth in 2009
 . One of the reasons is that a depreciation of 
domestic currency enhanced competitiveness and absorbed the shock to a certain 
extent. This point is shared with some other NMS. What makes Poland different 
from the other NMS? Richter, el al. (2009) mention the following points : i) the 
country’s size; ii) its relatively low levels of exports and imports; iii) a production 
structure more diversified than in other NMS; and iv) Poland’s domestic financial 
system appears to be in good shape with debt levels (of households, the government 
and corporate sectors) significantly lower than elsewhere
3. In addition to these 
points, we can add another factor: This country has had a relatively high share of 
people engaged in agriculture (19% of all employed people in 2004) and enjoyed 
higher prices of agricultural products after EU accession as well as support from the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. Therefore domestic demand has 
been kept in good shape
4.  
                                                 
3 However, Richter et al. (2009) say, “This fact is not a sign of an exceptionally forward-looking policy. 
Rather, it follows from the brevity of the preceding GDP growth speedup which started only in 2006 
and did not have time to reach the unsound proportion which characterized many other NMS” (p.4).  
4 Professor Witold Morawski (Kozminski University) and Professor Masahiro Taguchi (Okayama 
University) provided the author with useful opinions on this point. Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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The general picture of the economic crisis can be summarized as follows: First, 
countries with fixed exchange rates (countries adopting the euro, or with a national 
currency pegged to the euro or currency board regime) could not mitigate the shock 
through depreciation of their national currency and suffered severely. Among them, 
however, countries with fiscal room (Bulgaria and Slovenia) were able to increase 
their budget expenditure to stimulate their domestic demand and therefore were able 
to somewhat mitigate the shock. 
    Second,  in  countries  with  floating exchange rates, and where the share of 
loans denominated in foreign currency of all total loans was relatively small (the 
Czech Republic and Poland), the shock was also relatively small. In addition, the 
Czech Republic was able to adopt anti-cyclical policies by increasing budget 
expenditure. In contrast, however, countries where the share of loans denominated 
in foreign currency of all total loans was higher (Romania and Hungary), the shock 
was relatively large. 
Third, one country with a floating exchange rate, a higher share of loans 
denominated in foreign currency of all total loans and, in addition, a higher share of 
public debt compared with the GDP (Hungary) was not able to afford to undertake 
deficit spending, and in consequence its economic policies have become pro-cyclical, 
resulting in a more serious situation.   
        Fourth, since the Baltic States have had not only fixed exchange rates 
(currency board regime in Estonia and Lithuania, and euro-peg in Latvia), but also a 
huge amount of current account deficit, relatively large external debts, a very high 
share of loans denominated in foreign currency for total debts, etc. their economies 
have been very vulnerable to external shocks. 
  
3. The Baltic States 
3.1 General View 
 
The Baltic States are all small countries with the population of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania being 1.35 million, 2.3 million and 3.4 million respectively. These three 
states were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. They shared their 
destiny with the Soviet Union for almost half a century, but they gained 
independence in September 1991. In 2003 the population of the rural areas in these 
countries ranged between 31% and 33%. Since the 19th century the Baltic States 
have been agricultural countries. It was after incorporation into the Soviet Union that 
full-fledged industrialization began. The impact on the Baltic States of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and their secession from the COMECON block was enormous 
(Yoshino, 2004, pp.30-31). In the transition to a market economy all of them 
experienced ‘transformational recession’. In the meantime they became beneficiaries 
of the PHARE program in September 1991. In June 1995 they concluded European 
Agreement with the European Union, and in December of the same year they 
together made applications for full membership of the EU. Finally in May 2004 they 
accomplished their long-cherished desire, i.e. full membership of the EU. Thanks to Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  37 
this, the Baltic States joined the Single Market in the EU, enabling them enjoy four 
freedoms: free movement of goods, free movement of services, free movement of 
capitals and free movement of labor. The extensive economic area of the EU, in fact, 
consists of five regional groupings, like the five-ring Olympic emblem, in which 
relatively independent activities based on the specific characteristics of the regions 
are allowed. Among them a ‘microcosm of Europe’ such as ‘the Baltic Sea economic 
area’ has practically been formed with Sweden playing an outstanding role in the area. 
   
























The economies of the Baltic States turned upward around 1995. Although under 
the influence of the financial crisis in Russia in August 1998 their economies 
stagnated in 1999 (GDP growth rates declined in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to 
3.3%, -0.1% and -1.5% respectively.), they began to have high economic growth 
from 2000 (see Figure 1). Latvia in particular accomplished double-digit economic 
growth for three consecutive years from 2005 and also Estonia for two consecutive 
years from 2005. Such high economic growth can be partly ascribed to their active 
measures to attract foreign capital (reduction in corporate income tax, etc.). The 
amount of FDI inflow was already very large before their accession to the EU. 
Although it decreased at the turn of the 21st century, it increased again around 2004 
when the Baltic States were admitted to the EU. In Estonia the amount of FDI 
inflow as a percentage of GDP reached as high as 20.5 percent and it recorded 
double-digits until 2007. Both Latvia and Lithuania attracted a huge amount of FDI, 
although the amount was not as much compared with Estonia. Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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    Source: World Bank (2005), p.11. 
 
During this period the unemployment rate rapidly decreased in these countries. 
In 2001 the unemployment rate recorded a double-digit figure in these countries, 
12.9 percent, 11.9 percent and 17.4 percent in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
respectively. The unemployment rate was gradually decreasing. Being attracted by 
higher wage levels, labor migration to EU-15, especially the UK became popular 
after EU accession in 2004 (Figure 2), and the unemployment rate decreased more 
rapidly to around 5 percent in 2007. In parallel with this process domestic labor 
markets became tight, and consequently gross wages began to surge around 2004. 
The inflation rate was gradually increasing and in 2007 it rose suddenly to critical 
levels (14.1 percent in Latvia, 9.6% in Estonia and 8.1% in Lithuania). Around 2005 
the economies of the Baltic States reached the situation of overheating. Imports 
increased reflecting domestic consumption booms. Although there have been 
significant amounts of transfer from overseas, their current account deficits 
expanded, reaching unsustainable levels (current account deficit as a percentage of 
GDP in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania was -22.8 percent, -17.4 percent and -13.7 
percent respectively). 
 
Table 5  Ten Most Important Product Groups in Merchandise Exports to the EU-27 in 2008,   
SITC Classification 
    Latvia      Estonia      Lithuania     
Ranking Product  label  Share Product label  Share  Product label  Share  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  39 
1  Cork & wood  12.3   Electrical machinery 8.4  Petroleum & 
petro.products  26.4 
2  Iron and steel  10.3   Road vehicles 6.6  Fertilizers  6.3 
3  Cork & wood 
manufacture  7.0   Telecom apparatus  6.5  Furniture & parts 
thereof  4.9 
4  Road vehicles  6.5   Manufacture of 
metals  5.6  Plastics in primary 
form  4.3 
5  Telecom. 
apparatus  3.7   Cork and wood  5.2  Apparel & clothing  3.8 
6  Apparel & 
clothing  3.6   Furniture and parts 
thereof   4.9  Miscellaneous 
manu.articles  3.4 
7  Manufacture of 
metals  3.5   Miscellaneous 
manu. articles  4.9 Road  vehicles  3.4 
8  Miscellan.manu.
articles  3.0   Petroleum & 
petro.products  4.6 Diary  products  2.5 
9 Cereals  3.0    Cork &wood 
manufacuture  4.3 Electrical  machinery  2.5 
10  Metal.ore & 
scrap  2.8   Iron & steel  3.6  Manufacture of 
metals  2.3 




The industrial structure can be outlined as follows: About 5 percent of Latvia’s 
GDP is produced by agriculture, forestry and fishery and about 25 percent by 
manufacturing. The main items of export are products of so-called low-technology 
and middle-high technology including wood products such as wood and furniture, 
cast iron and steel (see Table 5). Nearly 70 percent of the GDP comes from the 
service sector, which includes the wholesale and retail trade, transport, shipping, and 
storage, real estate and information technology, etc. (Docalavich, 2006, pp.32-33). 
 Since the mid-1990s, Latvia has made remarkable strides and accomplished 
rapid convergence in income with its income per capita at purchasing power parity 
increasing by 16 percentage points compared to the average of EU15. It was among 
the fastest growing of the eight NMS in Central and Eastern Europe (IMF, 2006b). 
Seemingly for several years in the mid-2000s both government and people in Latvia 
indulged themselves in EU-Phoria
5. The economy continued to grow at a double-
digit rate for three consecutive years from 2005. Apparently the country was doing 
well, but around 2005 the economy began to show signs of overheating as illustrated 
by increasing inflation, rising wages and a widening current account deficit. In an 
interview in May 2009 a staff-member of the IMF said “As far back as 2005, we 
warned publicly that this economy was in danger of overheating”
6(IMF, 2009b). In a 
similar way, Emerging Europe Monitor published by Business Monitor International and 
                                                 
5 This expression is taken from the title of Rahman (2008). 
6 A Finish economist Jari Jumpponen (2005) pointed out signs of overheating in the Latvia’s economy 
in early 2005. p.50. Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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CEE Quarterly published by Unicredit group often pointed out in 2007 the necessity 
for soft landing to moderate economic growth. 
 
Tightening of labor market
Increase in wage









Transfer from EU funds
Inflation Lower interest rate 
Intensified external imbalance





International financial market September 2008
Lehman shock
Source: Extrapolated by the author based on information 
from a variety of sources (Emerging Europe Monitor, 
CEE Quarterly, IMF, etc.)
Figure 3  Overheating of the Latvian Economy, 2004 - 2007
Expansionary and pro-cyclical fiscal policy
Labor migration to UK and Ireland
 
 
The mechanism of the overheating of the Latvian economy (Figure 3) can be 
explained as follows: Foreign capital, which had flowed into the Latvian economy 
since the mid-1990s, greatly contributed to the economic development. Inward FDI 
stock amounted to € 7.261 billion as of 2007. As for investor countries, investment 
from Estonia, a neighboring country in the Baltics, rapidly increased in recent years. 
In terms of inward FDI stock Estonia exceeded Sweden in 2006 occupying first 
place. In 2007 Estonia occupies first place with its stock being € 1,044.8 million 
(14.5%), followed by Sweden (13.9%), Denmark (8.9%), Germany (8.9%), Finland 
(6.2%), the Netherlands (5.8%), USA (4.8%) and Russia (4.7%). It appears a little 
strange that the UK which is the second largest importer for Latvia is in 12th place 
(3.1%) in inward FDI stock. Possibly companies in the UK may have been investing 
in Latvia via their subsidiaries in Estonia. When we examine inward FDI stock 
considering economic activities, Financial intermediation takes up the biggest share 
(28.3%), followed by Real estate, renting & business activities (18.3%), Other 
activities not elsewhere classified (13.1%), Wholesale, retail trade, repair of vehicles, 
etc. (12.4%), Manufacturing (8.8%), Transport, storage and communication (7.9%), Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  41 
and Electricity, gas and water supply (5.3%). In this way, the share for manufacturing 
is very small (Hunya, 2008, pp.85-87). In recent years FDI inflow concentrated 
mainly in the non-tradable sector such as the retail trade, real estate and financial 
services. 
 
Table 6  Latvia - Main Economic Indicators     
   2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008  2009* 
GDP (y-o-y %-growth, constant 
prices) 
8 6.5  7.2  8.5  10.6 12.2 10.3 -10.3 -19.6 
Industrial production (y-o-y-
growth 
6.9 5.8 6.5  6  5.6 4.8 0.5 -6.7  -18.5 
Inflation (CPI, end period, y-o-y 
%-change) 
3.2 1.4 3.6 7.3  7  6.8 14.1 15.4 2.5 
Gen.government budget balance 
(% of GDP) 
-2.1 -2.3 -1.6 -1 -0.4 -0.2 0  -4  n.a. 
Gross wage (period average, 
EUR) 
282 297 298 314 350 430  683  678  670 
Unemployment (% end of period)  12.9 11.6 10.3 10.3 8.7  6.8 5.4  9.9 16.7 
Exports (€ million, current prices) 2232 2416 2559 3204 4085 4594 5727  6202  2327 
Imports (€ million, current prices) 3910 4284 4634 5671 6879 8828 10986  10534  3241 
Export/Import ratio  57.1 56.4 55.2 56.5 59.4 52  52.1 58.9 68.5 
FDI inflow (€  million, current 
prices) 
n.a. 223 248 489 568  1324 1797  909  50 
FDI inflow as % of GDP **  n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.4 4.4 8.3 7.8  4  n.a. 
Current account (% of GDP)  -7.6 -6.6 -8.1 -12.9 -12.3 -21.1 -22.8 -12.6  1.1 
* As for 2009, for GDP and unemployment data as of Q2, for gross wage and current account data 
as of Q1, for exports and imports data as of January - June, for FDI inflow data as of January -
March, for industrial production data as of June, for inflation data as of July, and for budget balance
an estimate for the whole year. ** Based on the author's own calculation.     
Source: Baltic Rim Economies, No.4, 2009, p.2.   
 
After EU accession unemployed persons, low-skilled workers and construction 
workers migrated to EU member countries, mainly the UK and Ireland, on a massive 
scale (It is officially estimated at 5% of the total labor force). For two years until early 
2006 the unemployment rate decreased by 2.5 percent to 7.75 percent, and the labor 
market became tight. As a result, combined with de facto wage indexation, nominal 
incomes increased in an accelerative way for two years and recorded an increase of 
more than 19% y-o-y in Q1 2006 (IMF, 2006a, pp. 9-11). This increase substantially 
surpassed the growth in productivity.  
Owing to the liberalization of financial services, banks from the Nordic region, 
Sweden in particular, came to operate in Latvia and competed for market shares. As 
mentioned above, the amount of FDI inflow had been relatively large, but it has 
been substantially surpassed by the current account deficit every year (Table 6). How 
has the gap been covered? The table of international payment (Bank of Latvia, 2009) Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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indicates that the amount of inflow of portfolio investment has been small (it often 
recorded negatives and consecutively recorded negatives from Q4 2008 through Q4 
2009). As a matter of fact, ‘other investment’ (it overwhelmingly has been 
borrowings by foreign-owned banks from parent banks) in the financial account has 
exceeded the amount of FDI inflow and covered most of the current account deficit 
every year until the end of 2007 (Banincova, 2009). Major banks in Europe depend 
to a lesser extent on deposits by general customers, however, as for financial 
resources in recent years they increasingly finance themselves on wholesale markets 
(Hoshino, 2009). Swedish banks obtained euros in exchange for Swedish Krona on 
the international financial market (for example, in London) and gave customers in 
Latvia (through subsidiaries in Latvia) loans denominated in euros
7. Thus households 
and enterprises in Latvia became able to enjoy lower interest rates. Credit to private 
sector residents increased by nearly 65 percent in 2005, and the loan to GDP ratio 
reached 70 percent, which was three times higher than the level in 2000, the highest 
among the EU8. Collateral loans to households increasingly became Euro nominated 
(IMF, 2006a, p. 11). The real estate sector came to occupy nearly half of all total 
loans
8. Economists at UniCredit group described Latvian people’s behavior as a 
‘spree of high consumption’ (CEE Quarterly, 03/2007).The IMF mission which 
visited the country in April 2007 warned the government of Latvia that the mindset 
of ‘buy now and pay later’ had taken root, increasing systemic risk. 
The fiscal policy was expansionary. In addition there has been inflow of EU 
grants amounting to 3-4 percent of the GDP every year. Programs such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provide households with direct income support. 
EU funds from Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds flowed into this country 
through public infrastructure projects and employment policies. Private companies 
were able to use EU funds in the form of upgrading of equipment (Allard, 2008). 
The fiscal policy was at the same time pro-cyclical. The budget revenue recorded 
natural increases due to a boom at that time, and it became a normal pattern that 
over-performance of the budget was not saved but instead consumed through 
additional expenditures on a supplementary budget towards the end of the year. At 
the Article IV Consultation
9 with the government of Latvia in 2006, IMF staff 
advised avoiding a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Finance ministry officials were mindful 
of the advisability of avoiding the pro-cyclical fiscal policy, but they said that it would 
be infeasible to leave a budget surplus this year in view of pre-election spending 
measures and large public sector wage increases. Rather taking into consideration the 
                                                 
7 Christoph Roseberg, Senior IMF Regional Representative for Central Europe and Baltics, says 
“Banks refinance themselves abroad and then pass on the currency risk to their clients”. Rosenberg 
(2008).   
8 According to IMF country report, banks in Latvia offer mortgage loans very easily, and “some banks 
are actually offering mortgages with LTV (loan to value) ratios above 100 percent”. IMF (2006c), 
Chapter III, Box 1. 
9 The IMF is to make consultations with governments of its member states once a year on the basis of 
the Article IV of the Agreement.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  43 
over-performance of the budget revenue, the government was planning a phased 10 
percentage point reduction in the personal income tax rate to 15 percent beginning in 
2007 in order to bring it into line with the corporate income tax rate and to 
encourage legalization of the shadow economy. However, responding to criticism by 
IMF staff, this plan was not implemented (IMF, 2006a pp.13-14 and p.23). 
The growth rate was as high as 12.2 percent in 2006. Economists at the 
UniCredit Group viewed it as consumption-led economic growth
10, saying the 
following: On the demand side, overheating domestic demand, in particular private 
consumption and capital formation, remained the main engine of growth, while on 
the supply side, sector serving consumption needs, i.e. trade, finance, commercial 
services, hotels and restaurants and construction were the ones to fuel growth. The 
manufacturing industry, however, grew at a below average rate. At the same time, 
external imbalances became more pronounced, with imports growing twice as fast as 
exports (CEE Quarterly, 01/2007). 
  Reflecting the consumption boom and the housing bubble, the inflation rate 
increased. It fluctuated between 1.4 percent and 3.6 percent until 2003 but jumped to 
7.3 percent in 2004 and recorded 7.0 percent and 6.8 percent in 2005 and 2006 
respectively. In November 2006 the central bank raised the refinancing rate by 50 
bps to 5 percent, which was still lower than the inflation rate – which meant the 
interest rate was practically negative – and proved quite insufficient to dampen the 
overheating economy (CEE Quarterly, 01/2007). Since its EU accession in 2004 
Latvia had had a goal of adopting the Euro in 2008, it was difficult for this country to 
have an interest rate quite different from that of the European Central Bank. In 
addition, when people can freely get loans in foreign currency it would be no use for 
banks to increase the borrowing rate in Lats
11. In 2006 Latvia satisfied all the criteria 
of Maastricht except the inflation criterion, and the country had to give up its plan to 
adopt the Euro in 2008.  
Increase in wages, surpassing a rise in productivity, as well as inflation gradually 
eroded Latvia’s export competitiveness. Every year the country recorded a huge 
amount of trade deficit, which was partly covered by FDI inflow, but it had still a 
wide current account deficit. In 2005 the current account deficit accounted for 12.7 
percent of the GDP, which was already an alarming amount, but rapidly increased to 
21.2% of the GDP in 2006. At the Article IV Consultation in Autumn 2006 the IMF 
mission expressed a view that measures were urgently needed to moderate domestic 
demand in order to decrease imbalances, preserve external competitiveness, bring 
forward compliance with the Maastricht criteria, and limit vulnerabilities ahead of 
Euro adoption. However, government officials did not have such a perception that 
the economy was overheated, and they were more sanguine in their assessment of 
economic developments and, accordingly, were not planning a significant change in 
the course of fiscal or other policies. Rather, Finance Ministry officials welcomed 
                                                 
10 The IMF staff made a similar remark. IMF (2006b), Public Information Notice, No.113. 
11 National currency of Latvia. 1 Euro =0.7028 Lat. Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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Latvia’s dynamic growth as essential to deliver income catch-up within a reasonable 
time horizon. They attributed the rise in inflation mainly to convergence in wage and 
price levels, rather than to overheating. On the other hand, the central bank officials 
were less sanguine, and saw overheating as a concern that was unlikely to subside in 
the near term (IMF, 2006a, pp. 14-16). 
 
3.3.  Switchover to restrained policies 
Even if the government was sanguine, foreign observers were very much 
concerned with the Latvian economy. Since the government left a huge amount of 
current account deficit with the external debt, exceeding 100 percent of the GDP, 
and in spite of the receding prospect of introducing the euro, S&P, a grading 
company, degraded Latvia from stable to negative in February 2007. From the end of 
February through early March of the same year the Lat came under pressure of 
depreciation on the foreign exchange market, the central bank was forced to 
intervene in the market for the first time in several years (EEM, May 2007). The 
government of Latvia finally switched its policy to manage aggregate demand more 
actively and launched a package of measures geared to delivering a durable reduction 
in inflation as follows: i) The government promised to balance the budget in 2007-
2008 by restraining spending growth; ii) Capital gains tax would be levied on real 
estate held for less than three years and state tax on registration of mortgages would 
be hiked; iii) Loans would be assessed on the basis of the legally declared income of 
prospective borrowers; iv) A maximum loan to value ratio would be established. At 
the same time, the central bank hiked the key refinancing rate from 5.0 percent to 5.5 
percent and reiterated its commitment to the current exchange rate regime (EEM, 
May 2007). In April in the same year the inflation rate increased to 8.9 percent. The 
central bank hiked interest rates by 50bps to 6 percent in May to support 
disinflationary measures. Accordingly, interest rates on mortgage loans in Euros and 
Lats have risen by about 100bps since 2005 to 5.7 percent and 7 percent respectively 
(EEM, July, 2007). 
      Such a package of measures did not have any impact on the economy 
immediately, and the consumption-led boom continued through Q3 of 2007. As the 
anti-inflation measures proposed by the government required time for discussion in 
the Parliament it was in July that they were approved and translated into action. Real 
GDP increased by a faster-than-expected 11.3% y-o-y in Q2 2007 (slightly up from 
11.2% in Q1). Manufacturing output declined by 0.2% from 2.4% in Q1 to 2.2% in 
Q2 owing to downturns in wood processing, furniture, radio, television and 
communication equipment sectors (EEM, October 2007). Although at a somewhat 
lower pace in Q3 2007, real GDP increased to a still high 11.9% y-o-y.  
        The government measures introduced in July began to have an effect in 
autumn. Property prices started to decline and by October were around 12% lower 
than at the start of 2007. The number of housing sales in the secondary market also 
started to fall, adding to the negative wealth effect (EEM, January 2008). The BNP 
Pariba shock, which happened in August 2007, increased financing costs at interbank Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  45 
markets, making credit activities more cautious (Tanaka, 2009). Among ‘other 
investments’ in the Latvia’s Balance of Payments (Table 7), the borrowing of funds 
by subsidiaries from parent banks showed positive so far, but turned negative in Q1 
2008, which meant backward flow of funds. Namely, the withdrawal of funds by 
parent banks from their subsidiaries occurred (although subsequently this item 
recorded positive in Q2 and Q3 2008, it recorded negatives for a consecutive five 
quarters from Q4 2008 through Q4 2009) (Bank of Latvia, 2009). Thus both 
companies and households came to feel a shortage of money. Real GDP growth 
eased to 9.6% y-o-y in Q4 2007, and the overheated economy began to lose its 
momentum. Retail sales growth dropped to a six-year low of 1.7% y-o-y in 
December, and industrial production contracted for the third consecutive month 
(EEM, April 2008). 
In this way, the Latvian economy made a hard landing. The Latvian housing 
market bubble burst. The number of transactions in the property market dropped by 
almost 18% in 2007, with prices for apartments in the capital city falling by a similar 
amount after having peaked in April at over € 1,700 (CEE Quarterly, 02/2008). In 
Riga, apartment prices fell by around 25% during the year to June 2008 (CEE 
Quarterly, 03/2008). In turn, the slowdown of the real estate sector negatively 
influenced consumption, via a wealth effect, and investment.     
Consumers had become more cautious in the face of the rising debt burden 
(household debt has risen from 9 percent of the GDP to approximately 55 percent at 
the end of 2007) and increased uncertainty about the outlook for jobs and income, 
while persistently high inflation (17.5 percent in April 2008) started to damage 
household purchasing power. Inflation-adjusted retail trade turnover fell by 1.1 
percent y-o-y in Q1 2008 while the number of newly registered cars was down 49 
percent y-o-y in March 2008. Private consumption was also being dampened by 
negative wealth effects associated with the steady decline in property prices, 7 
percent y-o-y in Q4 2007. The construction industry was also slowing down (EEM, 
July 2008). The economic growth rate rapidly decelerated from 12.2% in 2006 to 
10.3% in 2007 and -1.9% in Q2 2008. In contrast, the unemployment rate increased 
to 15.5% on average in 2008. It was stagflation.  
The Latvian economy fell into depression in December 2007. In addition to this, 
the Lehman shock in September 2008 dealt the Latvian economy a final blow. In 
October of the same year Parex Bank
12, the second largest bank in Latvia, was greatly 
exposed to sudden outflow of non-resident deposits and faced serious liquidity 
constraints. In the ranking of the top ten banks in Latvia there are four domestic 
banks with their total market share being 29.5% (Table 8). A remaining share (70.5%) 
is occupied by six subsidiaries of foreign banks, of which three are Swedish banks. In 
                                                 
12 According to Professor Sonoko Shima, Parex Bank was founded about 15 years ago by a Latvian of 
Russian descent, who started his business from an exchange house after the transition to the market 
economy. She presented this information at the annual conference of the Japan Association of 
Russian and East European Studies, held on November 17, 2009 at Akita University.  Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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contrast to this, subsidiaries of foreign banks occupy an overwhelming majority of 
the total share in Estonia and Lithuania with their share in the total asset in 2007 
being 98.7% and 85.3% respectively (Banincova, 2009). Thanks to this, both 
countries, Estonia and Lithuania, were able to find their way out of the financial 
crisis. In Latvia, however, Parex Bank was an indigenous bank which rapidly grew by 
collecting deposits from non-residents (people in Russia and CIS) and had no parent 
bank behind it, and therefore could not find a way out of the financial crisis. In early 
November the government nationalized this bank in order to prevent bankruptcy. 
     




Hansabanka 21.7%  Swedbank  (Sweden) 
Parex banka   14.6%  A private bank, taken over by the government on 
November 8, 2008. On December 5, 2008 State 
Collateral and Land Bank of Latvia became a majority 
owner. On February 24, 2009 shares owned by the 
government were transferred to the Privatization Agency. 
SEB Unibanka  14.1%  SEB (Sweden) 
DnB Nord  8.3%  DnB Nord: Joint Venture of DnB (Norway) and 
Nord/LB (Germany)  
Nordea 7.9%  Nordea  Group  (Sweden) 
Rietumu banka   5.6%  Majority private capital 
Aizkraukies banka  5.1%  Private local capital 
Latvijas Hipoteku un zemes 
banka 
4.2% State   
UniCredit 3.4%  UniCredit  Group  (Italy) 
Latvijas Krajbanka  3.1%  Snoras (Lithuania) 
Source: CEE Banking – Still the right bet, UniCredit Group, July 2008. 
 
The nationalization of Parex Bank aggravated the Latvian economic situation. A 
huge number of deposits were removed from other Latvian banks and placed in 
Estonian banks because they were perceived to be the safest due to their well-
capitalized Scandinavian parent banks. In the meantime, the central bank of Latvia 
had to intervene in the foreign exchange market to defend the fixed exchanged rate, 
resulting in a significant decrease in its official reserves (Banincova, 2009). In mid-
December the central banks of Sweden and Denmark hurried to rescue Latvia and 
concluded swap agreements with the central bank of Latvia. These arrangements 
enabled the central bank of Latvia to use a maximum € 500 million (of which € 375 
million came from Sweden) in exchange for Lats. These arrangements served as 
bridging loans until the IMF program for Latvia was finalized. Soon the rescue 
package for Latvia was decided as follows: The IMF provides Latvia with about € 1.7 
billion ($ 2.4 billion), supplemented with loans from the EU, the World Bank and 
Nordic and Central European countries. Specifically, the EU provides € 3.1 billion ($ 
4.3 billion), Nordic countries € 1.8 billion ($ 2.5 billion), the World Bank € 0.4 billion Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  47 
($ 0.5576 billion), the Czech Republic € 0.2 billion ($ 0.2788 billion), and EBRD, 
Estonia and Poland € 0.1 billion ($ 0.1394 billion) each (IMF, Press Release 
No.08/332, December 19, 2008). The total amount is € 7.5 billion ($ 10.5 billion), 
which is equivalent to a third of the Latvian GDP in 2008. 
    The credit is to be released in several tranches from the end of 2008 until mid-
2011. About half of the money is envisaged for covering the budget deficits, a third 
for financing the government debt and the rest for further bank recapitalization and 
loans to enterprises (Leitner, 2009, p.59). 
    With this external help, the financial market in Latvia managed to hold on, but 
Latvia was regarded as a highly risky country and it had difficulty to get loans from 
the international credit market. People’s complaints against the government 
increased, leading to riots in the streets of Riga in mid-January 2009, which were the 
first riots of this kind since Latvia’s independence in 1991. In February the coalition 
government led by Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis dissolved. In March a five-party 
coalition government led by Valdis Dombrovskis
13was formed.  
        It should be noted that the rescue package by the EU and IMF was 
accompanied by strict conditions. The government of Latvia was obliged to make a 
promise to cut its expenditure and reduce the budget deficit to 5% of the GDP. By 
April 2009, however, it was proved that the fall in government revenues was more 
dramatic than expected. The Minister of Finance announced that the budget deficit 
was expected to amount to at least 9% of the GDP in 2009, even when taking into 
account the planned additional, drastic expenditure cuts (Leitner, 2009, p.60). The 
attitude of the EU and the IMF was very strict in keeping to the tight fiscal policy. 
The EU and the IMF refused to release the second tranche of the rescue package, 
worth about € 1.7 billion (when adding the contributions of the Nordic neighbours), 
which was envisaged for the end of May
14. 
    By the end of May, forex reserves of the Bank of Latvia had dropped by 
almost 40% y-o-y and were dwindling day by day. In the first week of June the 
sovereign default of Latvia was looming, when the authorities failed to sell any 
Treasury Bills in a public debt auction. In the following week the development of the 
overnight Rigibor - the interest rate of Riga’s interbank market - , escalating to more 
than 20%, showed that interbank lending was drying up and in forward markets the 
Latvian Lat was traded for 50% of its nominal value (Leitner, 2009, p.60).  
    At that time, a possibility of devaluation of the Latvian national currency was 
whispered about both outside and inside (even within the government) of Latvia. 
                                                 
13 Mr. Dombrovskis was 36 years old when he was inaugurated Prime Minister. He is an economist 
with experience of working at the central bank of Latvia and has served as a member of the European 
Parliament. He formed a coalition government comprising the center-right New Era – his own party - 
, Civic Union, For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK, the People’s Party and the Union of Greens 
and Farmers (EEM, May 2009). 
14 According to the IMF Survey Magazine, the EU’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner 
Joaquin Almunia said May 6 that the EU would like to see more progress on budget and structural 
reforms before it releases the second tranche of its aid program, worth about € 1 billion (IMF, 2009b).  Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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However, the devaluation of the national currency would enhance the international 
competitiveness of Latvia’s export products on the one hand, but it would bring a 
sudden rise in the debt service obligation denominated in national currency for both 
companies and households on the other hand.  
  After all, the government of Latvia abandoned the nominal depreciation and 
chose ‘internal depreciation’ (adjustment of real economy), namely, a way of 
decreasing domestic prices primarily through cuts in wages and pensions, etc. and 
enhancing competitiveness of exports. The government opted for further austerity 
amendments to the budget for 2009, fixing a cut in government expenditures by 40% 
in 2009 compared to 2008, in nominal terms. The public wage bill was to be reduced 
by another 20% nominally, pensions by 10% for non-working pensioners, and for 
those working by 70%. Expenses for health and education were to be cut severely, 
two-thirds of the nation’s 73 inpatient hospitals and dozens of schools were 
announced to be closed. 
The non-taxable minimum for personal income tax was reduced by 60% and 
child benefits by 10%. Even Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the 
IMF, identified this as disputable due to the impact on the country’s poor (Leitner, 
2009, p. 60). The EEM voiced fears that an internal devaluation would lead to a 
painful debt-deflationary spiral, which would prove disastrous for social stability 
(EEM, August 2009).  
    Towards the end of July 2009 the IMF and the government of Latvia reached 
a staff-level agreement that could lead to the completion of the first review under the 
Stand-By Agreement. It was decided that Latvia would be given access to about € 
195 million ($ 278.3 million) in new financing after the staff-level agreement, which 
was endorsed by the IMF’s Management, if it gained approval by the Executive 
Board in early September. The point that the IMF staff stressed was that across-the-
board cuts provide a “quick fix” in the short term, they disproportionately hurt the 
poor and that they also have a negative influence in the longer run on the quality of 
government services. The IMF staff recommended a comprehensive strategy to 
improve the social safety net which includes guaranteed minimum income payments 
covering health copayments for the most vulnerable, increasing funds for emergency 
housing support, protecting schooling for six-year-olds, and promoting job creation 
through active labor market policies. In addition, the staff recommended 
improvements in tax administration and broadening of real estate and personal 
income tax, i.e. adopting progressive tax rates instead of a flat tax which had been 
adopted since 1997 (IMF Survey Magazine: Interview, July 28, 2009). 
Of course such consideration for the most vulnerable people is necessary, but 
being bound by the conditionality for the financial support from the EU and the 
IMF the government of Latvia is not allowed to adopt more active fiscal policies to 
boost the economy. In spite of relentless cuts in expenditure and the increases in tax 
rates as mentioned above, the budget deficit was expected to expand to 10% of the 
GDP in 2009 and 8.5% in 2010 (Leitner, 2009, p.61; IMF, 2009b). While the EU and 
the IMF allow such a substantial budget deficit for the time being, together with the Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  49 
government of Latvia they set the introduction of the Euro for 2013 as an exit 
strategy. In order to accomplish this, Latvia is required to satisfy the Maastricht 
criteria having a budget deficit of less than 3% of the GDP, public debt of less than 
60% of the GDP, etc. In this way, the government of Latvia is obliged to adopt pro-
cyclical policies following the framework of the EU and the IMF. As exemplified by 
cases in which neoliberal prescriptions have often failed in Latin America (Sano, 
2009), the Latvian economy will stagnate for a long time in the future. Latvian people 
are forced to practice austerities with increasing unemployment and cuts in wages 
and pensions, but I wonder until when they can endure such difficult lives.  
 
4  Sweden 
SEB and Swedbank hold significant market shares in Baltic States (40-80% in 
loan markets and 30-85% in deposit markets), and the financial authorities remain 
engaged with these activities (see Figure 4). Swedish banks’ equity and loan claims on 
their Baltic subsidiaries at the end of 2008 represented 8 percent of the Swedish 
GDP, while their loans to their subsidiaries amounts to 35-45 percent of bank 
capital. In addition, Swedish banks’ reliance on operating profits from Baltic 
operations is extensive (25% for Swedbank and nearly 10 percent for SEB) (IMF, 
2009b, p.29).  
Banks’ profitability fell sharply during 2008-09 despite negligible exposure to US 
subprime – or other structured – assets. Two of the largest banks (SEB and 
Swedbank), both increasingly funded on wholesale markets and were exposed to 
Baltic states, and both saw sharp increases in loan losses with their rating marked 
down accordingly (IMF, 2009b, p.14). It is also reported that share prices of banks 
such as SEB and Swedbank, which have huge balances of loans in Latvia, dropped by 
more than 10 percent in June 2009 (Nikkei Shimbun, June 10, 2009). 
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Figure 4  SEB and Swedbank: Exposures to Baltic Countries (As of End-2008）
Loans
Market share  78
Estonia GDP %           83
Deposits
Market share 84





Market share               40
Latvian GDP %            41
Deposits
Market share               29
Latvian GDP %            17
Loans
Market share             58
Lithuanian GDP %     37
Deposits
Market share             57
Lithuanian GDP %     19
Swedish GDP percent:2
Percent of bank capital :36
Swedish GDP percent: 3
Percent of bank capital: 40
Swedish GDP percent :3
Percent of bank capital: 44
Sweden
Parent’s share holding
and lending to subsidiaries
Local subsidiaries’ operation*
Source: IMF (2009a), Sweden: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation, p.29.
Original: Banks’ annual reports; the authorities’ websites; and IMF staff estimates based 
on publicly –available information.
*Deposits exclude non-residential deposits.
 
    Riksbanken (the central bank of Sweden) as well as Finansinspektionen 
(Finance Inspection Agency of Sweden) conducted stress tests for the largest banks 
(Nordea, SHB, Swedbank and SEB) independently. According to a memorandum 
published by Finansinspektionen, this stress test presupposed the following 
scenarios: 
1.  Conservative base scenario 
2.  Extreme stress in Eastern Europe 
3.  Scenario 2 + a prolonged recession in Western Europe 
 
In the base scenario, all of the banks meet the minimum regulatory capital 
requirements by a solid margin and none of the banks fall below a nine percent Tier 
1 capital ratio. In scenario 2, two banks, Swedbank and SEB, credit losses exceed 
profits during the above mentioned three years. SEB and Swedbank reach 
significantly lower Tier 1 capital ratios
15 at the end of 2011, 8.2 percent and 6.0 
percent respectively. In scenario 3, for three banks not including SHB credit losses 
exceed profit. For all of the four banks Tier 1 capital ratios decrease at the end of 
2011, but all of them fulfill the minimum regulatory requirements by a solid margin.  
    Scenario 2 and 3 assume very high credit loss levels. Finansinspektionen views 
that these scenarios are improbable but not impossible. It calls banks’ attention, 
                                                 
15 Tier 1 refers to banks’ owned capital in the narrow sense.   Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  51 
saying that the future continues to be highly uncertain and the banks must be in a 
good state of preparedness, even for improbable scenarios (Finansinspektionen, 
2009). 
    According to economists at the central bank of Sweden, in contrast to US and 
British economies, banks play a very important role in the Swedish economy. 
Because both companies and households in this country are heavily dependent upon 
loans from banks and other credit institutions. Bank loans account for over half of 
corporate debt financing. The portion of debt financed via the securities markets 
plays a significantly lesser role for companies. Corporate bonds and commercial 
papers comprise only 9 and 2 percent, respectively, of companies’ total borrowing. 
The remainder, other loans, mainly consists of loans raised within the corporate 
group (including cross-border loans). In 2008 a number companies encountered 
difficulties in finding buyers for their bonds overseas. Although inflow via issues of 
bonds in foreign currencies increased in Q1 of 2009, repayments exceeded inflow of 
funds from the second half of 2007 through November 2008. The central bank of 
Sweden estimates the shortfall in financing for major companies arising during 2008 
has partly been replaced by foreign bank loans and partly by bank loans in Sweden 
(Ekici, Guibourg and Asberg-Sommer, 2009). 
    During the global financial crisis the central bank of Sweden did everything in 
its power in order to protect the banking system. The banks have become unwilling 
to assume counterparty risk by lending money without collateral to other banks, 
especially at longer maturities. Banks that have surplus liquidity now prefer instead to 
deposit this money at the central bank even though the interest rate on such deposits 
may be lower. At the same time an increasing number of banks choose to borrow 
from the central bank against collateral instead of on the interbank market. During 
the crisis, alongside its normal operation, the central bank has taken other more 
unconventional measures which are listed as follows: i) providing loans to 
commercial banks at longer maturities; 2) providing loans in US dollars; 3) approving 
a wider range of securities as collateral for loans; and 4) increasing the circle of 
monetary policy counterparties (Sellin, 2009). The economists at the central bank say 
that although there was a decline due to cyclical factors, there are no signs of any 
credit crunch thanks to such unconventional measures (Ekici, Guibourg and Asberg-
Sommer, 2009).  
    In addition, central banks in Nordic countries and the Baltic states have kept 
up a network of close cooperation (Ingves, 2008). It seems the least probable 
scenario that the financial crisis in Latvia will cause disorder in the EU economy via 
the possible collapse of Swedish bank(s).   
   
5  Conclusion 
Taking all of the above into consideration, we can conclude as follows: First, in 
Latvia a boom continued in the mid-2000s, and the economy showed a sign of 
overheating already in 2005 but the government responded to it too late. Only in the 
spring 2007 did the government turn to restrictive policies, causing depression in the Economic Crisis in New EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: Focusing on Baltic States 
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end of 2007. In addition to that, the Lehman shock dealt the Latvian economy a final 
blow. EU membership has both positive and negative aspects. Thanks to the Single 
Market in the EU, workers in this country became able to migrate to advanced EU 
countries, especially the UK, decreasing the unemployment rate and at the same time 
causing a sharp increase in wages due to a tightened labor market. Owing to the 
liberalization of financial services, banks from the Nordic region, Sweden in 
particular, came to operate in Latvia and competed for market shares, stirring the 
consumption boom. In a situation in which people can easily get loans denominated 
in foreign currency the financial policies of the central bank of Latvia are of no use. 
Within the framework of the EU monetary authorities in Sweden, which is the home 
country of Swedish banks’ subsidiaries operating in Latvia, are responsible for 
supervision, but they have not regulated these financial institutions there.  
        Second, Baltic states have had a common weakness in terms of their 
development relying heavily on foreign capitals. In the case of Estonia and Lithuania, 
however, the circumstances in which foreign-owned banks have been 
overwhelmingly dominating the banking sector benefited these countries. Namely, as 
parent banks of foreign-owned banks coped with difficulties both countries were 
able to avoid the worst situations.   
    Third, Latvia, which is reconstructing its economy under support from the 
EU and the IMF, set the introduction of the Euro in 2013 as an exit strategy. Latvia 
is in a dilemma: If the country does not devalue its national currency and tries to 
satisfy the Maastricht criteria (especially having a budget deficit less than 3% of the 
GDP) soon, it will be obliged to adopt pro-cyclical policies, causing economic 
stagnation. It is a noteworthy opinion that the IMF should offer credit lines to 
governments rather than the central banks of developing countries so that they can 
afford to have expansionary budgetary programs (Frenkel & Rapetti, 2009).     
  Fourth, financial authorities in Sweden have been properly responding to 
difficulties the domestic banking system has been facing. It seems the least probable 
scenario that the financial crisis in Latvia will cause disorder in the EU economy via 
the possible collapse of Swedish bank(s). 
    Fifth, new EU member states are required to satisfy the strict criteria 
mentioned above in order to adopt the Euro. Nevertheless, since they have 
experienced the global financial crisis they will make greater efforts towards the 
introduction of Euro, echoing a Japanese proverb saying “Look for a big tree when 
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